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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
HONORABLE ELIOT SPITZER
I want to talk for a few minutes about securities law. It
seems to be the topic of the day, and it seems to be a part of
current events as well. But when I was thinking about it, it
occurred to me that when I took securities law back seventeen or
eighteen years ago, I don't think I had ever heard reference to
the Martin Act.
As we began our endeavors, I guess it was back on April 8th,
when we unveiled our first actions against Merrill Lynch, people
found out that we were relying upon the Martin Act, which has
been a state statute since 1921, and said, "Gee, where did this
new law come from?"
In fact, it isn't a new law. It's been there. It indeed
precedes many of the federal securities laws that are part and
parcel of what you study when you study securities law. Yet,
when in fact you practice at a firm, you rarely use it. There's
always been a blue sky practice, but rarely do people pay
attention to the state statutes.
I think, if nothing else has come out of this endeavor, we've
changed that a little bit. People are now dusting off the Martin
Act, as they refer to it in the press, and they are finding out that
indeed it grants expansive jurisdiction to the New York State
Attorney General. And this is not limited to New York.
Analogous statutes across the nation grant similar powers to the
other states' securities regulators-whether it's the attorney
general or the securities commissioner depends upon the state.
But this power has really been diversified, and it has been
distributed quite broadly across the nation. So I want to begin
with a little discussion of federalism, which strikes me as
actually having been the most important issue, other than the
corporate accountability issues that we are now seeing, which is
a spasm that may last beyond a year or so. Certainly if there
has been a theoretical shift in our jurisprudence over the past
fifteen or twenty years, it has been the shifting bounds of
federalism and what we weigh. It is referred to as the new
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federalism. It is what we refer to as states rights, and I think
that gives you an insight into where people's political views
might lie.
But I want to begin with a little story. I won't take too long
on it because I do want to talk about what's actually going on out
there in the world of investment banking and the dynamics
between or among the investment banks, their clients, and the
major players in the field.
The story begins in about 1983 or 1984, when I was in law
school. This new federalism was beginning to be enunciated,
and it was something that struck me back then as something
that, if not abhorrent, was certainly something that I disagreed
with. It struck me that it was nothing more than states rights
dressed up in a different language. It was nothing more than an
effort to dismember the set of statutes that had been passed in
the 1970s, 1980s, and even the 1960s, statutes that we believed
in deeply-civil rights laws, environmental statues, antitrust
laws, or whatever the particular statute might have been.
It was an effort to say we wanted the civil rights laws to be
interpreted by a state attorney general down somewhere where
that attorney general may not have believed in these statutes as
much as the main enforcers of justice traditionally did.
It was an effort to disburse enforcement and denigrate and
diminish the powers that existed in Washington. So I was
theoretically opposed to it. I believed in a uniformed aggressive
application of these statues, and the new federalism struck me
as an effort to dissipate all that.
Nobody cared what I thought. I was second or third year
student in law school, and no one cared. It's the stuff that maybe
in your study group you'd waste two minutes talking about, and
then you'd go on to "Gee, what does that case really mean? We
got to pass this exam."
Now the other reason that I disagreed with it is that most of
the proponents-and this I think is actually the more powerful
reason to oppose the new federalism-who supported it came
from Yale and that, in and of itself, struck me as being a
foundation of which to be skeptical.
But, nonetheless, a funny thing happened over the next
couple years with respect to the new federalism. They won, and
we lost. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence over the days since
President Reagan's two terms, President Bush, Sr.'s term, and
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even President Clinton's tenure (because he simply didn't have
the faith of history-he didn't have the opportunity to appoint as
many members of the supremes) has continued to follow the new
federalism. One footnote that I guess we have to drop-and I
guess we all know consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds-
is that little case Bush v. Gore, which arguably seems to
contradict most of the federalists principles that were being
enunciated in the prior decade. But we don't expect anything
more of the supremes than we expect of others. So we will put
that one to the side.
Nonetheless, the new federalism won. It was manifested
also in congressional actions in terms of power being shifted back
to the states. It was something that just continues to be at the
centerpiece of the shift. I will admit that, and here is how this
becomes relevant to what's going on today.
I will admit that I woke up on a particular day and had an
epiphany about the new federalism and, as you might predict, it
wouldn't be hard to figure out when that was. It was when I was
elected attorney general of the state. It occurred to me that
power being a zero sum game, if these guys were saying we don't
want it here in Washington, but you guys should exercise all
these powers back at the state level, it began conceptually to
become a more appealing notion.
So suddenly I began to reevaluate this, and I said, "Huh,
maybe all those environmental statutes, the antitrust laws, the
civil rights laws, even the securities laws, will present us with an
opportunity to begin to flex our muscles." I didn't want to say
have some fun as though this is a game, but rather begin to do
what we think the law should be doing, even if it is not being
done in Washington.
Now, I began to articulate this concept a little bit and we got
involved in a few litigations, which I won't run through, that
began to rattle a few cages. After that, I got invited down to a
federalism society meeting in Washington. I said, "Wow, either
they really think I believe this, in which case I've got to examine
my own principles, or there's something more sophisticated afoot
here. These guys, you need to understand, are very
sophisticated, very smart, and they had invited me down to a
meeting of their major donors. It was a room several times
larger than this, filled by people who paid probably several times
your annual tuition just to be there for the lunch.
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It was a fundraiser for the federalism society. So I
understood what the game was. They were holding me out as
Exhibit A. They were kind of holding me out there to the side,
pointing to me saying, "If you are not careful, you will get him."
I think it scared them. I think it succeeded in raising a fair
bit of money for the federalism society. The next time I am
invited, I am going to be smarter, and I'm going to say, "Okay, I
will show up, but I want ten percent."
See, I wasn't quick enough last time to throw that in the
negotiations. But I challenged them at one point and I said,
"Wait a minute guys. You have given all this power back to the
states and yet you are now objecting to the Microsoft litigation,
to the tobacco litigation, to the environmental litigation we had
begun against the mid-western power companies whose
emissions were polluting our air"--a series of litigation that I
think are wonderful examples of state attorney generals flexing
their muscles.
I said to them, "Isn't this directly contrary to what you've
been enunciating for a number of years? Aren't you lacking in
intellectual integrity when you now want to handcuff the very
parties who you thought should be at the center of this?"
Somebody put up his hand in the back and said, "Who cares
about intellectual integrity?"
You know, so I said, "Well, at least the terms of the debate
are now being clear, and I have a prediction for you. Now that
state attorney generals and others at the state level are
beginning to enforce these statutes in a more aggressive manner,
you will see not necessarily the academics, who really believe in
federalism as a theory of decision making and where decision
making should be, but you will see those on the political side of
it, who are more interested in outcomes than the underlying
decision process, begin to rearticulate the notion that "gee,
decisions being made in Washington which parenthetically we
control right now don't look so bad."
Did this happen in the securities context? Yes. I will give
you Exhibit A in my argument on this matter. Soon after we
began with Merrill-not after we began the investigation but
after we announced the results of the first stage of the filing of
the affidavit that laid bare the emails-an amendment was
floated in the House and passed by those representatives who
had supported federalism principles.
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What did this amendment say? It stripped state attorneys
general of jurisdiction over securities issues. Now how do you
like that for the ultimate, you know, turn of events that shows
the fallacy in their thinking? Anyway, all of that is the
backdrop, which I think is curious and interesting in terms of
how the new federalism will or will not emerge.
But now let me just turn directly to securities issues which
have captivated a little bit of my time recently, probably much to
the consternation of the professor I had in law school who didn't
think I spent a lot of time studying the issue when I was there.
But that's a separate issue. I had a good outline for the exam.
That was the saving grace.
Let me say this about the world of securities law. I hear you
had a stupendous presentation this morning about Enron and its
rise and fall. I won't get into Enron per se. Let me begin by
saying that there has been, by and "large, a breakdown in
corporate governments. It extends to non-private sector
governance as well, but I won't get into that today. I mean, just
parenthetically, I think it affects government, elected
government, and the not-for-profit world.
But let's today, for the purposes of this, keep our discussion
to the for-profit world. There has been historically in the
corporate world-forget private entities for now-a series of
checks and balances that have been in place to ensure that no
one decision maker in the corporate world wields too much
power. Just as there has been a series of checks and balances in
our public government that are designed to ensure that there is
not an imbalance, there has been a structure in the private
sector to do the same thing. Just as in the public sector, where
there have been moments when that balance was knocked out of
kilter-for example, when we had and imperial presidency that
many people felt took us down a path that was unsatisfactory-
we have now just passed through a period of the imperial CEO.
The reason for this is that each of the links in the chain that
is designed to constrain the CEO broke. Every one of those links
failed. What are those links?-Boards of directors, audit
committees, outside auditors, outside lawyers-which is perhaps
where we in this room have a greater role-, institutional
shareholders-which is something that has gotten too little
attention, and investment banks-which have always been a
critical check and a critical part of the corporate governing
2002]
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system because they are the critical intermediary between the
public company and the financial markets.
Now the good news is that when you have a catastrophic
failure of this sort, there tends to be a reaction. Sometimes the
reaction is excessive. Sometimes it lacks subtlety. Nonetheless,
there has been a reaction. There has not, however, been a
sufficient reaction with respect to each one of these critical links.
Let's take them and go through them bit by bit. Board
behavior will change prospectively. Why? To a certain extent it
will change because the New York Stock Exchange in its listing
requirements is now mandating that boards be constituted
differently, that there be greater independence, and that there
be greater involvement. Board behavior will change because if
you sit on the board of a public company right now, let me put it
plainly, you are scared. You are terrified. You don't know what
is going on inside that company, and you are deathly afraid that
your name is going to be in the headline in a way that will make
you very unhappy.
Imagine if you are the chairman of an audit committee right
now. Frankly, I am not sure why people would want that
position, given the enormous difficulty of fulfilling the mandate
the way it has to be fulfilled. But board behavior will change. I
say this based on many conversations I've had with people who
sit on many boards, from General Motors down to the smallest
company that's listed, but you've never heard of. Their
aggressiveness, their understanding that they were asleep at the
switch for too many years, and their understanding that they
were all too happy just to raise their hands and vote in the
affirmative because the numbers looked good, will no longer out-
weigh their understanding that they'd better ask the hard
questions or else they are going to be there with potential
personal liability. The listing requirement from the stock
exchange and the exposure that board inattentiveness has had
will change board committees.
Audit committees likewise. Audit committees are now
asking the hard questions. Whereas the reports of auditors-
who we will get to in a second-used to be adopted anonymously
without any hard questions, now committees are saying, "We
have got to ask the hard questions."
Now let me drop a footnote here-I only talk about footnotes
when I am in front of lawyers. There is a fare debate whether
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what Dick Rasso did with respect to board membership is right
or wrong. I happen to have enormous, enormous respect for Dick
Rasso. I think he is a wonderful guy who stepped into the
breach and is trying to do the right thing.
Having said that, there is a theoretical discussion about how
you define your perfect board participant. When Dick Rasso set
up as sort of the paragon of good board membership, the
independence that we think leads to neutrality and aggressive
judgment calls and aggressive inquiry, just as we want an
independent judiciary, what he sacrificed-and I have heard this
from people on both sides of the debate-was the sort of in-depth
knowledge of a company that comes from having lived inside the
company for many years. Sometimes-and of course I am
setting up a little bit of a straw man here-you don't need these
two to be in opposition to each other. You can have boards that
have both.
But there is a very interesting debate out there going on in
the world of corporate governance about whether or not you
want independent board members who only know the company
from a distance, from their contact through the CEO, and
perhaps from their inquiry of other individuals. But they
haven't lived inside the company. They haven't been
compensated by it for many years, evolved with the company,
and actually built the widget that the company makes over many
years. Therefore, they don't understand the day-to-day
problems. They don't understand the market better. They don't
understand the competition better.
What you get in the more antiseptic participation of a
neutral outsider is perhaps the greater distance and willingness
to ask hard questions. But sometimes they don't know the
questions to ask. So this is a debate that I think should be
played through at academic institutions, such as this one, among
those who are studying issues of corporate governance.
But let me go back down the chain part of this to the
auditors-one of the other critical links. The auditors clearly
have been in for and will continue to be in for a rocky period. It's
not only that we've gone from the "big eight" a couple years ago,
down to the "big four." There has been this diminution, either
through bankruptcy, indictment, or shredding. They are sort of
disappearing. It's not a pretty picture, and it leads to perhaps
excessive concentration.
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But the auditors clearly misdefined their role over the past
decade, just as lawyers did, and we'll get to them in a second.
The auditors, instead of saying to the world at large, "Our duty
is to you and to the financial community to paint the most
accurate picture of the finances of this company that we can
paint," they began to view themselves as part of management of
the company whose job it was to push the boundaries and push
the envelope of gap and say, "What can we get away with."
Again, not to simplify this-the analysis of Enron that you
got this morning was much more sophisticated than what I
know-but certainly what might have begun as one off balance
sheet partnership that was innocent enough and not material,
exploded in a way so that the entire company was being
described in the footnotes.
We all know it-you put in the footnotes that which you
don't really want people to read. Is that right? I mean that's
what we did in law review articles. That's where all the "but
sees" go, you know, the things that really don't support your
case.
So the auditors began to play games. If it wasn't criminal,
which in 99.9% of the cases it wasn't of course, it strayed from
the fundamental purpose of having the outside auditors report
for the benefit of the investing community. That will be
changed.
What we have then is the Sarbanes Bill. I still choke
whenever it's called the Sarbanes-Oxley Bill, given my own little
dynamic with Congressman Oxley. But nonetheless, if they call
it the Sarbanes-Oxley Bill, I'll defer to them. The Sarbanes Bill
will begin to address some of the needs in the accounting world.
Lawyers, let me tell you, we fell down on the job. I don't
think there is any question about it. We did not go to the
prosecutors. We did not even go to the boards even though
perhaps we were ethically required to say, "There is criminal
conduct afoot here. There has been straying. There are sham
transactions that we are papering that are designed to be
nothing more than tax games, and we should not be part of this."
We fell down on the job. There will be a debate likewise
about the ethical obligations that we have as lawyers and the old
inevitable question that we all study in legal ethics-who is the
client?
I think it does reveal so many of the issues. Is the client the
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CEO? No, it's the shareholder as represented by the board. We
have to remember that. Therefore, in terms of disclosure issues
and how we report problems that we see, we have to be cognizant
of that, which is an issue the bar associations nationally and
otherwise are beginning to look at.
Now let me focus on two last groups, and let me look at
institutional shareholders first.
Some of the institutional shareholders forgot during the
1980s and the 1990s, when everybody was looking great, that it
was their money that was being played with. They became the
ubiquitous passive institutional investors. Everybody bought
into that model, that of the major pension funds. Everybody
said, "Well, it isn't our job to manage the companies. Sure we
own eighty-three percent of the marketplace, but we don't want
to be there in a position making day-to-day management
decisions."
There is a lot of power to that argument. But they went so
far to the other end of the spectrum that they really lost their
capacity to understand what was going on inside the companies.
It was their money that was being played with, the option
packages that were being approved by compensation
committees-where you can just see a picture of everybody
standing around in circles and scratching each other's back. The
compensation committees completely lost their grounding and
their bearing, and it was because the people whose money was
being given away--even if it was only by dilution of their stock
interest-simply weren't being heard from.
Think about the enormous loss of equity ownership that is
reflected in these enormous grants of stock options. Right now
there are many who are going to make a very powerful and at
times persuasive argument in sectors that deal with new
technologies or start up ventures, that you need to use stock
options as a way of compensating those whose ideas are being
grown over a long term. That powerful argument, which has a
lot of merit to it, doesn't apply as much when you are dealing
with established companies that are essentially industrial
companies where production is the day-in-day-out business. I
just don't think the argument applies, and I think you will see
the whole issue of CEO compensation and option packages
revisited because of it.
Institutional investors have to come back to life. Long term,
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it's their money. No amount of regulation will ever be as
successful or as powerful as shareholders whose money is at risk
pounding the door of the CEO saying, "Don't do that. You are
going to be voted out next week if you make that decision. I'm
going to vote against you in the next proxy round," or whatever it
may be.
That has got to start happening. We are trying to organize
that because I think that market discipline is ultimately going to
be what solves this problem. The market discipline of having the
pension funds stand up to be heard from is critical. Phil
Angelides, who is the treasurer of California; Richard Moore,
who is the treasurer of North Carolina; Carl McCall, who is the
comptroller here in New York; and about seventeen states
together whose public pension funds control in excess of one
trillion dollars in equity-when they all begin to think through
how they can use their pension fund assets to* begin to exercise
management control in a way that will be meaningful, that is
what will restore the moral groundings of what the CEOs are
doing.
Now let me focus for the next couple of minutes on the group
that I have been learning probably more about than I want and
certainly more than they want over the last couple of years-the
investment banking world.
They are, as I said, the critical intermediary between the
public companies and the markets. Let me discuss the
incestuous relationship that existed with the investment
bankers over the past couple years. Analysts would write
reports that would generate enormous sell pressure-selling if
you are doing the underwriting, buying if you are doing the pubic
offering. Obviously, they were usually sell-side guys. They
would write these reports that were essentially just puff pieces
for the stock. Why would they do it? Because the analysts were
being compensated not for the quality of their research, but for
bringing in investment banking clients. This is now something
that no investment bankers with a straight face can deny. Six
months ago, they would all stand up sanctimoniously and say,
"Well we don't compensate our analysts based on the investment
banking work they bring in. We compensate them because they
are good."
Well funny things happen when you subpoena documents
and read what actually goes on. They were being compensated
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directly and overwhelmingly for bringing in investment banking
business. Take Jack Grubman. Jack Grubman was not being
paid twenty million dollars because his research was good. Now I
don't want to tell you what he would have been paid based upon
the quality of research, but I can tell you it wasn't twenty million
dollars.
We have the documents bank-to-bank-to-bank that show
that the analysts would send the memos to the compensation
committee saying, "Here are the deals we brought in." They
didn't bring those deals in because they were going to write a
report that would say, "This stock is a dog. This stock shouldn't
be in your portfolio. It's worthless." Now, they may have said
that in the emails internally, but the public reports were strong
buy, strong buy, strong buy.
So that's the analysts. Now, the investment bankers of
course are being compensated for bringing the deals. They had
to bring in the deals. Now what did they say to the CEOs?
When the analysts and investment bankers went to the CEOs
they said, "If you bring your underwriting business to us, what
are we going to do for you? Two things. One, the analyst will
write the strong buy recommendation and two-and here is the
candy we are really talking about-we will give you IPO
allocations."
What does that mean? We know that in the hot stocks, the
hot IPO allocations-hot IPOs that were brought into the
marketplace couple years ago-had such a demand that a stock
that went out at thirty-five would be trading at seventy within
two minutes. There was just excess demand. There are question
whether they were under pricing the stock in the first place, but
that's a more complicated discussion. By giving somebody access
to those IPO allocations, you give them straight out money-
cash in their pockets.
Now, on a first year law school exam, say criminal law,
imagine the fact pattern said, "The store manager of a Wal-Mart
is having a meeting with a vendor, and the vendor walks in and
says, 'Gee, if you put my sneakers on the shelf up front, I'll give
you $5,000 cash, and here it is.'"
We would say, "You can't do that. That's commercial
bribery." Wal-Mart to its credit-I don't pick them for any
reason-is enormously strict. They won't let the vendor buy a
cup of coffee for the store manager.
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Now let's change the facts a little bit. The exam instead
says "CEO of a company walks in the door to the investment
bank with of course plush carpets and nice mahogany walls." It
looks and sounds a little different. But they say to him, "you
bring your underwriting to us, but we will give you, not the
company, but individually IPO allocations to the tune of a few
million bucks." Is that legal?
I'm not going to answer the question, yet. But I don't think
so. Maybe. Anyway, the point is you had this incestuous ring
from analyst to investment banker to CEO. Now who is left out
in this? Who's left out is the shareholder-folks like you and I
who go out there and buy shares because the analyst says buy
the stock. Folks who don't know that internally the analyst is
saying, "This stock isn't worth it. I wouldn't want my
grandmother buying this stock."
We end up holding the stock. The analyst got his salary.
The CEO cashed out on the IPO allocations. The investment
bank got its fees up front. They used to have a name for that, a
Ponzi Scheme, right? Isn't that what it was? They get their
money up front, and you and I are stuck holding something. It's
a con game. It may be a little more subtle than that in terms of
what was going on, but that is the essence of this dynamic and,
it's not right.
Now, here is the good news. The game is over. The
investment bankers know it. It is beginning to end, whether or
not people are let off, you know, the proverbial perp walks, which
I happen to think are not a good idea. I mean I don't think we
operate that way, you know, waiting until there is a conviction to
humiliate people that way.
But nonetheless, the game is over because as somebody said
about the securities markets many years ago, "Sunlight is the
best disinfectant." The fact that there has now been scrutiny
applied to these various dynamics means that things are
changing. The investment banks know they have to change
what has been going on.
How that will happen is going to be a long tedious process. I
can't tell you that I can see down the road where the changes
will take us exactly or what the mechanism will be. Will it be by
virtue of individual enforcement actions that other officers bring
or by actions my office brings? Will it be by rule making out of
the SEC or by a congressional enactment? Who knows? That
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crystal ball we can all read equally well or poorly.
But there will be change because I think now there has been
enough light shed on the problem so that no investment banker
will seriously contend to you that the system was fundamentally
different than what I just outlined. They know it, and they know
that the game is up. So there will be change. That is the good
news.
Thank you for your patience. It's an honor to be here.
Thank you.
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